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gated certain munitions manufacturing scandals . In 1931, he was the
chairman of a blue ribbon Royal Commission on Railways and Transportation in Canada . In 1942, Duff was appointed by MacKenzie King to
conduct an enquiry into the Hong Kong affair, apparently well-founded
allegations having been made that, before the Pearl Harbour disaster in
1941, untrained Canadian troops had been sent to Hong Kong, and, to
make matters worse, sent without equipment they should have had. Duff
did not distinguish himself as a Royal Commissioner to the same high
degree that he achieved as a judge, especially in his Hong Kong report .
Readers will find that David Williams covers all this with great care,
assessing the evidence with the sure sense of an experienced barrister .
The book is written in a clear and lucid style, in spite of the difficulty
ofmany of the issues being explained. In particular, readers without legal
training need not fear that they will have trouble understanding. Williams
avoids legal jargon and his story flows easily . We should appreciate,
though, that this sort of writing is never attained without long and painstaking effort running through many drafts of the text . As a famous author
has put it: "The more easily anything reads, the harder it has been to
write. There is no such thing as light-hearted spontaneous creation, save
in the mind, before it is set down on paper" .
The biographer gives us his conclusion in a carefully crafted paragraph:'

Because Duff was surrounded by mediocrity for most of his time on the court, it
may be thought that he himself was not the dominating figure he is commonly
believed to be, and that although he stood above his fellows, his own stature must
be measured by the small scale of theirs . To put it another way, it may be argued
that he was a small hill on a level plain. His judgements, however, belie this notion .
More cogently, perhaps, his international reputation belies it: Lord Haldane, Lord
Hailsham, Lord Simon, Lord Atkin, Roscoe Pound, and Felix Frankfurter all spoke
of Duff as one whose learning was equal, if not superior, to theirs . The collective
opinion of these judicial giants is unarguable : Duff did stand apart from his contemporaries, a colossus by comparison .
W.R . LEDERMAN *

Construction of Statutes . Second Edition . By E .A . DRIEDCER .
Butterworths . 1983 . Pp . xvi, 385 . ($60 .00). Statute Law.

Toronto:
By Fran-

cis Bennion . London: Oyez . 1983 . Pp . xxii, 276 . (£10 .00)
The dichotomous state of the literature on statutory interpretation provides an accurate assessment of the health of that branch of legal learning .
Those who claim to have the potions to nurse the legislative patient back
to health do not seem to have a very clear idea of the disease. The other
side claims to understand the disease but they offer no remedies . On the
P. 275.
* W.R . Lederman, Q.C ., of the Faculty of Law, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario.
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one hand, we have the text books used by practitioners and courts ; Maxwell'
is the most comprehensive but it is a mass of contradictions and, as is the
case with a book of proverbs, any user can find some maxim or Latin tag
to suit his or her, purpose . On the other hand, there is a very large
periodical literature ; every student of the law seems convinced that he or
she has the definitive word on the subject. The text book approach is an
application of black letter law in the system of case precedent. The
writers of learned articles are talking about jurisprudence or judicial process . The two groups do not seem to communicate.
Driedger certainly falls into the black letter text book class . The
author is very respected both in this country and overseas . A. reading of
his useful book does not reward us with a sense of purpose or the presence
of a cohesive philosophy of statutory interpretation . The book is a useful
source for "proverbs" of statutory interpretation and although Dreidger
attempts more that, he fails to convince . When compared with Dickerson,'
Driedger's book seems rather lacking in cohesion in the sense that there is
little attempt to tackle the problem of a systematic interpretation . I mean
no disrespect to Driedger who has laboured for, years as the solitary
prophet of statute law (at least since Read, Willis and Corry Canadians
have paid less attention to the subject) .' I also know that in teaching
statutory interpretation, it is very seductive to spend most of the classroom time on interesting cases and on the maxims because by those
means the teacher and students can play lawyers' games with words, fine
distinctions and nit-picking . I think Dickerson has moved from there and
has started to ask questions about the meaning of meaning and about the
paucity of lawyers' knowledge about Language, their stock-in-trade . Bennion
also points out that case law precedent is an inductive process while the
"processing" of statutes is a deductive one. Of course, it is impossible to
avoid discussions about the difference between "may" or. "shall" , "means"
and "includes", and "and" and "or", but we must move on from there.
Driedger (and Bennion) both point out the three basic "rules"-Literal,
Golden and Mischief are no longer viable and we are now merely
looking at the intention of the legislator . This is not very useful if all that
is achieved is an attempt to reconcile case law because reconciliation of
case law is irrelevant .
'
What are the courts or the lawyers doing when they are faced with a
problem of interpretation? Of course, part of the problem is that eighty or
ninety per cent of lawyers or- judges in this country have never studied
statutory interpretation in a formal way . When they switch from the
1 P.B . Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed., 1969) .
z F.R . Dickerson, The Interpretation of and Application .of Statutes (1975) .
s John Willis, Statute Interpretation In a Nutshell (1938), 16 Can. Bar. Rev. 1; J.A .
Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes (1935), 1 Univ . of Tor. L.J .
286; H.E . Read, J.W . MacDonald, Cases and Other Materials on Legislation (1948) .
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familiar law reports and have to read statutory language, their eyes glaze
over in rather the same way that an avid reader of prose has great difficulty switching to poetry .
In the past decade or so, there has been a change in judicial style .
This may have been caused by an improvement in judicial appointments,
more adept or ardent advocacy, increase in legal aid or improvements in
legal education. One sees less of the scissors-and-paste style of judgment .
The courts are less slavish in their exaggerated respect for the House of
Lords. They are more willing to quote the documents of the law reform
commissions and the learned works of living authors, including Canadian
authors . The judges are more open in their discussion of policy . While
these changes may have resulted in an enriched Canadian legal culture, it
does not appear to have affected many cases of statutory interpretation .
The most obvious example is the judicial approach to the Literal Rule .
This alleged rule of interpretation is meaningless in vacuo . If a section or
a phrase in a statute is in dispute, it should be obvious that the literal or
ordinary meaning does not exist in the minds of the parties for the simple
reason they are now arguing over the meaning of the same words. Of
course the words cannot be read in a vacuum . They must be read in the
context whether that means one applies ejusdenl generis, or noscitur a
sociis, the mischief rule or examines legislative history . Any of these
approaches would be an improvement on a mindless resort to some dictionary, whether non-descript or authoritative .
What do our two authors say about the Literal Rule? In his first
edition in 1974, Driedger had said that there was now only one approach :
"the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the
Act, the object of the Act and the intention of Parliament' .4 Bennion is
not very impressed, he described that statement from Dreidger as saying
everything and saying nothing.' In the new edition, Driedger says "ft]oday's
doctrine is therefore still a doctrine of "literal" construction but literal in
total context and not, as formerly, literal in partial context only" .' This is
not really very helpful .
Does Bennion offer us anything better? He suggests that we must
develop new methods of interpretation and suggests a Processing Act
which would include the following provisions :'
5.(2) the intention is primarily to be derived from the legislative text itself (including any source referred to in the text).
(3) the court may refer to any other source in addition if it thinks fit to do so
having regard to the requirements of justice, including -

4 E.A . Driedger, Construction of Statutes (lst ed ., 1974), p. 67 .
5 Bennion, p. 94 .
6 Driedger (2nd ed ., 1983), p. 87 .
Bennion, p. 305 .
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(a) the desirability of persons being able to rely on the meaning conveyed by the
text itself, and
(b) the need to avoid prolonging legal proceedings without compensating advantage .
(4) The court shall have regard, so far as may be relevant, to the procedures by
which, in accordance with constitutional practice, the text may be taken to have
been created and validated as law.

Bennion argues quite rightly that the judges do make the law . It is simply
a legal fiction to think otherwise but he is suggesting that we should try to
regularise this process. I do not gain much solace from Bennion's model
Processing Act . Driedger does not pay much attention to this question .
Dickerson is emphatic in saying that he wants judges to solve interpretative problems- by cognition before they resort to creation . Dickerson does
pay some attention to the problems of language and communication and I
find that lacking in Driedger and, to a large extent, in Bennion despite his
elaborate process of "processing" .
At the very least we should be able to develop some fairly straightforward rules about the use and meaning of such words as "shall" and
`_`may", "and" and "or", etc . Would it be very difficult to formulate a
protocol for the use (or prohibition) of dictionaries, law or otherwise? Is it
beyond our ken to draft rules for the proper and improper use of judicial
notice, previous versions of statutory language, Hansard and royal commission reports? In other words, we should fight problems of statute law
with statute law . Bennion makes some tentative steps in that direction. He
is aiming at some kind of synthesis . While Dreidger gives us .much
valuable information, his book lacks this vision .
GRAHAM PARKER

A Century of Criminal Justice. By MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND. Calgary:
Carswell Legal Publications . 1984 . Pp. xxii, 245 . ($32 .50)

This book contains a smorgasbord of intellectual delights served up by
one of Canada's master chefs, Professor Martin L. Friedland, sometime
Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto and sometime member
of the Law Reform Commission of Canada. Included in this feast is
something for all. tastes - bread and butter items for the practitioner,
meat and potato courses for judges, and exotic dishes for the real afficionados
of the criminal law.
Professor Friedland has produced some superb scholarship. His Double Jeopardy,' which was based on his doctoral thesis at Cambridge
*Graham Parker, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Downsview, Ontario
(1969) .

